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of Asʿad al-Yānyawī*
Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī (Yanyalı Esad Efendi, d. 1143/17301) was 
one of the most interesting intellectual figures of the first quarter of the eighteenth 
century, under the reign of Ahmed III. In spite of the interest aroused by his intel-
lectual activity, still much is left to know about his philosophical production. Born 
in Ioannina (the Ottoman Yanya), in north-western Greece, he started his education 
under the guide of Mehmed Efendi, Mufti of Yanya, and of İbrahim Efendi, before 
moving to Constantinople in 1098/1686, where he was appointed as a professor in 
1111/1699. He took part in the translation project that started under the patronage 
of the Grand Vizier Damad İbrâhim Paşa of Nevşehir: his main interest was with 
the Arabic translations of philosophical and scientific texts, and in 1721 he was 
commissioned to provide a new translation of Aristotle’s works.2 At that stage of 
* The present research stems from the survey on the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ within 
the framework of the ERC Project: “PhiBor – Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations and Intellectual 
Endeavours: Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt of Kitāb al-Šifā’) of Avicenna 
(Ibn Sīnā)”; my gratitude goes to the principal investigator of the project, Amos Bertolacci, for provid-
ing me with all the reproductions of the manuscripts concerning this work. I wish also to thank Maroun 
Aouad, director of the ERC Project: “PhiC – Philosophy in Context: Arabic and Syriac manuscripts in the 
Mediterranean,” and his collaborators for their precious support in the research of the manuscripts. Among 
the collaborators of the PhiC Project, I wish to thank particularly Teymour Morel for the fruitful discus-
sions on several points concerning the present research; I also wish to thank Dr. Gholamreza Dadkhah, 
collaborating to the PhiBor Project, for his precious help, especially for his patient revision of some of the 
transcriptions that I provide in the present paper. All the shortcomings are, of course, only mine.
1 Al-Yānyawī’s death is dated to 1134/1722 in Gutas Dimitri (1998), Greek Thought, Arabic Culture – The 
Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ‘Abbasid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th centuries), 
Routledge, London/ New York, p. 175. Al-Yānyawī was, however, still alive in 1725, when he was appointed 
as judge of Galata; for al-Yānyawī’s biography, see Aslan Adnan (2006), “As‘ad Afandi of Yanya,” in 
Leaman Oliver (ed.), The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic philosophy, vol. I: A-I, Bloomsbury, 
London/ New Delhi/ New York/ Sydney, p. 39-40; see also Şahin Naim (2005), “Türk Mantıkçıları,” 
Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi 1/ 17, p. 343-354 (esp. p. 349-350).
2 On Al-Yānyawī’s activity as a translator, see: Kaya Mahmut (1992), “Some Findings on Translations Made 
in the Eighteenth Century from Greek and Es‘ad Efendi’s Translation of the Physics,” in İhsanoğlu 
Ekmeleddin (ed.), Transfer of Modern Science & Technology to the Muslim World, IRCICA, Istanbul, 
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his career, Asʿad al-Yānyawī showed a deep interest in the Aristotelian philosophy 
and its reception: as I shall argue in the present paper, the breadth of his interests 
also encompassed Avicenna’s most complete philosophical summa concerning the 
Aristotelian philosophy, namely the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ.
The manuscript tradition of this work, that counts up to more than two hundred 
manuscripts, is still a matter of investigation.3 A first systematic inquiry into the 
manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ is now being conducted within the 
framework of the ERC Project: “PhiBor - Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations 
and Intellectual Endeavours: Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt 
of Kitāb al-Šifā’) of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā),” directed by Amos Bertolacci.4 According 
to the provisional results of this survey, at least three manuscripts of Avicenna’s 
summa circulated or were even produced in the school of Asʿad al-Yānyawī, namely 
a copy of the section on natural philosophy of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ, which preserves 
an ownership note of Asʿad al-Yānyawī,5 but whose date of copy and copyist are 
unknown, and two manuscripts containing the section of logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ, 
arguably copied in this school. 
The present inquiry will focus on the two eighteenth-century manuscripts preserv-
ing the section of logic (ğumlat al-manṭiq) of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ, namely mss. Istanbul, 
Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 and Atıf Efendi 1565.6 Both manuscripts 
reveal some new evidence of al-Yānyawī’s intellectual activity in the period in 
which he was professor in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople. 
In what follows, I will argue that they preserve several marginalia quoting some as 
p. 385-391; Özervarlı M. Sait (2011), “Yanyalı Esad Efendi’s Works on Philosophical Texts as Part of the 
Ottoman Translation Movement in the Early Eighteenth Century,” in Schmidt-Haberkamp Barbara (ed.), 
Europa und die Türkei im 18. Jahrhundert/Europe and Turkey in the 18. century, V&R University Press, 
Bonn University Press, Göttingen, p. 457-472; Küçük B. Harun (2013), “Natural Philosophy and Politics 
in the Eighteenth Century: Esad of Ioannina and Greek Aristotelianism at the Ottoman Court,” Osmanlı 
Araştırmaları 41, p. 125-158. See also Gutas Dimitri (2000), “Translations from Greek and Syriac” s.v. 
“Tardjama,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, ed. Bearman P., Bianquis T., Bosworth C.E. 
et al., Brill, Leiden/ New York, vol. X, p. 225-9, esp. p. 228.
3 As a preliminary step towards the more recent systematic inquiry into the manuscript tradition of this work, 
see Bertolacci Amos (2008), “On the Manuscripts of the Ilāhiyyāt of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Shifā’,” in 
Akasoy Anna and Raven Wim (eds.), Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages – Studies in Text, Transmission 
and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber, Brill, Leiden/ Boston, p. 59-75.
4 Of great importance for this survey is the collaboration with the ERC Project: “PhiC – Philosophy in 
Context: Arabic and Syriac Manuscripts in the Mediterranean,” directed by Maroun Aouad.
5 Ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 796; the first folio preserves an ownership note by 
Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī, and the manuscript has plenty of marginal notes signed by Asʿad. 
On these marginal notes, see infra, §I.1.2.
6 Both mentioned among the manuscripts containing the logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ in Gutas Dimitri (2014), 
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition – Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, Second 
Revised and Enlarged Edition, Brill, Leiden/ Boston, p. 421. 
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of yet unedited translations by Asʿad al-Yānyawī, and even some interesting and yet 
unstudied notes of his own on Avicenna’s text (section I). Then, I shall argue that 
both manuscripts derive from the same exemplar, namely a manuscript that must 
have circulated within Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s school and that must have preserved some 
marginalia to Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ that are also preserved in three thirteenth-
century manuscripts ascribed to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210)7 (section II). 
I. The Logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ Within  
Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s School
I.1. Ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 [= ms. P]
I.1.1. A General Presentation of the Manuscript
Manuscript Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 [henceforth: ms. P]8 
(end of the copy: yawm al-ḫamīs 29 Ğumādā al-āḫira 1134/ Thursday, 16th of April 
1722) contains only the section on logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ. According to the infor-
mation provided in the colophon (T1), the manuscript was copied in the madrasa of 
Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople by Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī, under 
the request of Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī himself. 
T1. Ms. P, Colophon, fol. 426r:
قد وقع الفراغ من تنميقه بعون المعين وحسن توفيقه عن يد العبد النحيف الضعيف المحتاج إلى 
رحمة ربّه اللطيف، الراجي عفوه يوم يؤخذ بالنواصي محمّد بن أحمد األسكوبي ساكنًا في مدرسة 
أبي أيّوب األنصاري وقت الظهر في يوم الخميس التاسع والعشرين من شهر جمادى اآلخرة في سنة 
أربع وثلثين ومائة وألف؛ رحم الله امرءاً نظر في هذا المكتوب ودعا لكاتبه ولباعث كتابته المعروف 
بأسعد بن علي بن عثمان الينيوي سّلمه الله ولجميع المؤمنين والمؤمنات. والحمد لله ونعم المعين 
والصلوة والسالم على محّمد سّيد العالمين. 
The end of its [scil. the book’s] composition has come with the help of the Helper, 
and the excellence of its result [has been attained] by the hand of the weak, frail 
servant, in need of the mercy of his Lord the Kind, hoping for His forgiveness 
7 An edition of these marginal notes and a reconstruction of their manuscript tradition is provided in 
Di Vincenzo Silvia (2018), “Early Exegetical Practice on Avicenna’s Šifāʾ: Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s 
Marginalia to Logic,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28/1, p. 31-66. 
8 A description of the manuscript is provided in the catalogue: Dughaym M. al-Sayyid (2010), Fihris 
al-maḫṭūṭāt al-ʻarabīya wa-al-turkīya wa-al-fārisīya fī al-Maktaba al-Sulaymānīyya, Saqīfat al-Ṣafā 
al-ʿIlmiyya, Ğidda, p. 556-558.
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the day he will be seized by the forelocks9, Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī, 
staying in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī  at midday on Thursday, day 29 
of the month of Ğumādā al-āḫira in the year 1134 [= 16th April 1722]; may God 
give mercy on the man who looks at this text and prays for its copyist and for him 
who encouraged its copy, known as Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī, may 
God protect him and all the men and the women having faith in Him. The praise 
belongs to God, and may the grace of the Helper, His blessing and His peace be on 
Muḥammad, Lord of the world.
Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī was one of Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s students active 
in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī,10 where Asʿad al-Yānyawī was professor at 
the time ms. P was copied. This piece of information regarding al-Yānyawī’s biogra-
phy is provided by the colophon of his translation and reworking of the Compendiosa 
Logica in Usum Scholarium11 by Ioannes Cottunius (d. 1658), preserved in mss. 
Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2568 and Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi, 
2655,12 which was reportedly accomplished the day 21 of Ğumādā al-āḫira 1134 (i.e. 
April 8th, 1722, just eight days before the end of the copy of ms. P) when Asʿad 
al-Yānyawī was professor in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople.13
  9 Cf. Qurʾān 55:41: “The guilty will be known by their distinguishing marks and will be seized by the fore-
locks (fa-yuʾḫaḏu bi-l-nawāṣī) and the feet.” It is a humility statement on the copyist’s part, who portrays 
himself as guilty.
10 Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī is also the copyist of ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 
812 (preserving al-Fārābī’s summaries of Aristotle’s logic), copied in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī 
just a year before the copy of ms. P (in the month Ğumādā al-āḫira of the year 1133 H/1721). In the colo-
phon of the manuscript, the copyist explicitly mentions Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī as his pro-
fessor (ustāḏ). I owe this piece of information to Teymour Morel, who worked on ms. Hamidiye 812 within 
the PhiC Project; Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, p. 175 mentions an Aḥmad al-Uskūbī as the 
copyist of ms. Hamidiye 812 and Al-Yānyawī’s student, relying on Türker Mubahat (1963), “Fārābī’nin 
“Şerā’it ul-yaḳīn”i,” Araştırma 1, p. 151-152, 173-174.
11 Cottunius Ioannes (1669), Compendiosa logica in usum scholarium, Ex Typograph. Matthaei Bolzetta de 
Cadorinis, Padova.
12 The translation bears the following title: al-Šarḥ al- anwar fī al-manṭiq. According to the catalogue, 
Şeşen Ramazan (1997), Muḫtārāt min al-maḫṭūṭāt al-‛arabīyya al-nādira fī maktabāt Turkiyyā, Waqf 
al-Abḥāṯ li-al-tārīḫ wa-al-funūn wa-al-ṯaqāfa al-islāmīya, Istanbul, p. 296, the two manuscripts preserve 
Al-Yānyawī’s translation of Aristotle’s logical works, but on ms. Ayasofya 2568 see Özervarlı, “Yanyalı 
Esad Efendi’s works,” p. 464. The work is also described by Aslan, “As‛ad Afandi of Yanya”  (p. 39) 
and by Özervarlı, “Yanyalı Esad Efendi’s works,” p. 464, who both mention this work under the title 
Tarğamat Šarḥ al- anwar and claim that, more than being just a literal translation of the Aristotelian 
logical corpus, it contains an Arabic translation of a summary and commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, 
De Interpretatione, Prior and Posterior Analytics  by Ioannes Cottunius.
13 For the text of this colophon, see Şeşen, Muḫtārāt min al-maḫṭūṭāt, p. 296.
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I.1.2. Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s (autograph?) Marginalia to the Logic  
of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ
Ms. P is a witness of special relevance to the study of al-Yānyawī’s reception of 
Avicenna’s Šifāʾ: in fact, it preserves several marginal notes ascribed to Asʿad 
al-Yānyawī himself that went almost unnoticed so far and that deserve more consid-
eration. Each note is ascribed to al-Yānyawī by the signature “Asʿad” at the end of 
the text. At first glance, it is clear that these notes contain very specific remarks of 
philosophical interest concerning Avicenna’s text. As a first example, I shall present 
below (T2) two marginal notes ascribed to Asʿad al-Yānyawī which comment on 
Kitāb al-Madḫal I 4.14
T2. Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Madḫal I 4, p. 22.7-12 Cairo ed. and al-
Yānyawī’s marginal notes in ms. P (fol. 5r):
The main text:
وكذلك صناعة المنطق، فإّنها ليست تنظر في مفردات هذه األمور من حيث هي على أحد نحوي 
الوجود الذي في األعيان والذي في األذهان، وال أيضا في ماهيات األشياء من حيث هي ماهيات، بل 
من حيث)١( هي محموالت وموضوعات وكّليات وجزئيات وغير ذلك مّما إّنما يعرض لهذه المعاني 
من جهة ما قلناه فيما سلف)٢(.
[The case of] the discipline of logic is analogous, since it doesn’t inquire into the 
simple ones among these things inasmuch as they are in one of the two ways of 
existence, [i.e.] the one that is in the individuals and the one that is in the minds, 
nor [does it inquire into] the things’ quiddities inasmuch as they are quiddities, but 
rather(1) inasmuch as they are predicates and subjects [of predication], universals 
and particulars and other [things] among what only occurs to these notions under 
the respect that we said in what preceded(2).
The marginal notes:
)١( فيه إشارة إلى أّن موضوعه هي المعقوالت الثانية، كما سيصّرح به فيما بعد؛ وقد صّرح به في 
أوائل اإلالهيات. أسعد
(1) There is in it an indication of the fact that its [i.e. logic’s] subject are the 
secondary intelligibles, as it will be explained in what follows; it has also been 
explained in the beginning of the Metaphysics.15 Asʿad. 
)٢( أي في الفصل الثاني؛ قال فيه: “بل من حيث ينفع في إدراك أحوال ذينك الوجودين”. أسعد
14 Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Madḫal is quoted from the following edition: Ibn Sīnā (1952), al-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, 1. 
al-Madḫal, ed. Madkūr Ibrāhīm, Qanawātī Georges Š., al-Ḫuḍayrī Maḥmūd and al-Ahwānī Fuʾād, 
al-Maṭbaʿa al-amīriyya, Cairo (henceforth: Cairo ed.).
15 See Ibn Sīnā (1960), al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt I 2, ed. Mūsā Yūsuf M., Dunyā Sulaymān and Zāyid Saʿīd, 
Cairo, al-Hayʿa al-ʿāmma li-šuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-amīriyya, p. 10, 17 – 11, 2.
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(2) I.e. in the second chapter [i.e. Kitāb al-Madḫal I.2]; he [scil. Avicenna] said in 
it: “but rather inasmuch as it is useful for the acquisition of the states of those two 
[kinds of] existence” [a verbatim quotation of Kitāb al-Madḫal I 2, p. 15, 18-19 
Cairo ed.]. Asʿad.
(1) In the case of the first marginal note, Asʿad al-Yānyawī identifies an allusion 
Avicenna made to the subject of logic (namely the secondary intelligibles), which is 
not explicitly spelled out in the passage at stake. Therefore, Asʿad al-Yānyawī makes 
it explicit in his marginal note and also recalls another passage of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ 
in which the subject of logic is dealt with, namely the beginning of the section on 
Metaphysics, which very likely refers to Kitāb al-Ilāhiyyāt I 2, p. 10,17-11,2.16
(2) The second marginal note on the passage aims at clarifying Avicenna’s vague 
reference to something he stated in “what preceded”. Asʿad al-Yānyawī interprets the 
reference as a hint to Kitāb al-Madḫal I 2, p. 15,18-19 Cairo ed., which he quotes 
verbatim: the portion quoted is part of Avicenna’s statement that logic is a theoretical 
inquiry concerning the things inasmuch as it is useful for the acquisition of the two 
kinds of existence, namely the existence in the external reality and that in the mind. 
The two examples discussed so far show the exegetical purpose of al-Yānyawī’s 
marginalia. Some other marginal notes in the same handwriting end with the clause 
“li-nāmiqihi Asʿad ” or “li-nāmiqihi al-faqīr Asʿad ” (“[The note] belongs to the one 
who wrote it, the poor Asʿad”), which seemingly points to the fact that not only 
Asʿad al-Yānyawī is the author of these glosses, but that he himself must have writ-
ten them in the margins of ms. P.17 A transcription of the marginal note on fol. 13v is 
provided below (T3) by way of example:   
T3. Ms. P, fol. 13v:
إّنه الذي” إلى آخره ليس الثاني هو ما ذكره فقط، بل الثاني على ما خرّجه صاحب  قوله “والثاني 
الكلّيات، أعني پورْفريوس، وغيره من الشرّاح هو الذي يوضع تحت الجنس ويقال عليه الجنس فيما 
هو؛ وإنّما نقّصه لنقصان فهمه بالمأخذ. لنامقه الفقير أسعد عفي عنه.
16 Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt I 2, p. 10,17-11,2: “The subject matter of logic, as you have known, was 
the secondary intelligible ideas (al-maʿānī al-maʿqūla al-ṯāniyya) that depend on the primary intelligible 
ideas (allatī tastanidu ilā al-maʿānī al-maʿqūlati al-ūlā) with respect to the manner (kayfiyya) by which 
one arrives through them from what is known to what is unknown (yutawaṣṣalu bihā min maʿlūmin ilā 
mağhūlin) —not [however] with respect to their being intelligible[s], having [that] intellectual existence 
that either is not at all attached to matter or attached to noncorporeal matter,” tr. in Marmura Michael E. 
(tr.) (2005), Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing. A parallel English-Arabic text, Brigham Young 
University Press, Provo (Utah), p. 7.
17 I would incline to think that the notes are autographs by Asʿad al-Yānyawī, rather than that someone else 
copied them in ms. P, because of the presence of the humility formula al-faqīr (“the poor”), which points 
to the fact that Asʿad al-Yānyawī is describing himself in such a way. On the use of similar humility state-
ments, see Gacek Adam (2009), Arabic Manuscripts – A Vademecum for Readers, Brill, Leiden/ Boston, 
p. 239-240.
The Circulation of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā’ in the School of Asʿad al-Yānyawī 333
His statement “and the second [definition] states that it is the one that...” up to the 
end: the second [definition] does not consist in what he mentioned only, on the 
contrary, the second [definition], in the way in which the Master of the Universals, 
i.e. Porphyry, and the other commentators produced it, is that “it is that which is 
subsumed under the genus and of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what 
is it?’”; he [scil. Avicenna] failed [to correctly mention] it only because he failed in 
understanding the source [of the passage]. [The note] belongs to the one who wrote 
it, the poor Asʿad, may [God] forgive him.
The note comments on Kitāb al-Madḫal I 11, p. 60, 14-15 Cairo ed., where 
Avicenna mentions the second of Porphyry’s definitions of the species as “that of 
which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’” (aḥaduhumā qawluhum 
[...] wa-al-ṯānī innahu allaḏī yuqālu ʿalayhi al-ğins min ṭarīqi mā huwa). Asʿad 
al-Yānyawī raises an objection against the way in which Avicenna reports Porphyry’s 
definitions of the species, claiming that the second definition provided by Porphyry 
actually states that the species is “that which is under the genus and of which the 
genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’”. Al-Yānyawī’s objection is grounded in 
a different interpretation of Porphyry’s text (Isag., 4, 9-11 Busse),18 which is slightly 
ambiguous. In fact, there are two possibilities to understand the passage: it could be 
read (a) as if Porphyry were presenting two definitions of the species, namely one 
claiming that the species is what is under the genus and the other claiming that it is 
that of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’,19 or (b) as if the two 
statements were parts of one and the same definition, claiming that the species is that 
which is under the genus and of which the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is 
it?’.20 Reading (a) is Avicenna’s way of understanding the passage, whereas reading 
(b) is al-Yānyawī’s. The difference between the two readings depends on the way the 
conjunction “and” (καὶ) is interpreted, namely on whether it is taken as a conjunction 
between two different definitions (a) or as a conjunction between two halves of the 
same definition (b) of the species. 
The note in T3 provides us with an interesting insight into al-Yānyawī’s attitude 
towards the text he comments. A general feature of his exegesis seems to be a care-
ful study of Avicenna’s work along with an attentive reading of the Greek text it 
18 Poprhyrius (1887), Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, ed. Busse Adolf, 
(CAG IV.1) Reimer, Berlin, p. 4.9-11: ἀποδιδόασιν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ οὕτως· εἶδός ἐστι τὸ ταττόμενον ὑπὸ 
τὸ γένος καὶ οὗ τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται.
19 According to this reading, the passage could be translated as in Barnes Jonathan (tr.) (2003), Porphyry, 
Introduction, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 5: “Now they present species thus: a species is what is ordered 
under a genus; and: that of which a genus is predicated in answer to ‘What is it?’.”
20 In this case, the passage could be translated thus, modifying Barnes’ translation: “Now they present species 
thus: a species is that which is ordered under a genus and of which a genus is predicated in answer to ‘What 
is it?’.” 
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comments.21 As far as his attitude towards the author of the text he comments is 
concerned, clearly he doesn’t refrain from criticism when his interpretation diverges 
with respect to Avicenna’s22.
To sum up, this brief overview of the marginalia preserved in ms. P provides 
us with a clue about Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s study of Avicenna’s logic. However, the 
presence of al-Yānyawī’s most probably autograph marginal notes in ms. P is not an 
isolated phenomenon: several marginal notes in the same handwriting and signed in 
an identical manner (“Asʿad”)  are to be found also in the margins of the aforemen-
tioned witness of the natural section of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ owned by Asʿad al-Yānyawī, 
i.e. ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 796. I would suggest that both 
ms. P and ms. Hamidiye 796 were annotated by Asʿad al-Yānyawī himself. Hence, 
one should expect a systematic survey of al-Yānyawī’s notes in both manuscripts to 
reveal many relevant details concerning al-Yānyawī’s reading of Avicenna’s text. 
I.2. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565 [= ms. A]
I.2.1. A General Presentation of the Manuscript
Manuscript Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565 [henceforth: ms. 
A] is a witness of the first half of the logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ (more precisely, the 
first five funūn, namely al-Madḫal, al-Maqūlāt, al-ʿIbāra, al-Qiyās and al-Burhān). 
Although neither the date nor the place of copy are stated in the colophon, it is 
nonetheless possible to contextualize the manuscript within the same milieu as ms. P. 
The main text was copied in ms. A by several scribes, who also alternated in 
copying the great number of marginalia preserved in the manuscript. It is possible 
to date approximately at least one of the several handwritings alternating in the copy 
of the text (for the sake of simplicity, hand1):23 in fact, hand1 is also the author of a 
number of notes copied on some folios that were added to the manuscript at a second 
stage, and some of these notes reproduce excerpts of a commentary on Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics translated by Asʿad al-Yānyawī, together with the date 29 Ṣafar 
21 This peculiar attention to the original text is consistent with the fact that Asʿad al-Yānyawī produced Arabic 
translations of Porphyry’s Isagoge and of other parts of Aristotle’s logic, fragments of which are preserved 
in the margins of ms. A; on this point, cf. infra, §I.2.2.
22 Asʿad al-Yānyawī is classified among the “anti-Avicennist Peripatetics,” in Gutas Dimitri (2002), “The 
Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 – ca. 1350,” in Janssens Jules and 
de Smet Daniel (eds.), Avicenna and his Heritage – Acts of the international colloquium, Leuven-Louvain-
la-Neuve, September 8-September 11, 1999, Leuven University Press, Leuven, p. 81-97 (esp. p. 97).
23 It is the handwriting that copied, for instance, the text from fol. 101r to fol. 103v.
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1135 /December 9th, 1722.24 If this date corresponds, as I think, to the date in which 
the note was copied in the added folio,25 then it can be argued that hand1 was actively 
working on ms. A on the 9th of December 1722. What is more, these notes, as well 
as other marginalia in the manuscript, refer to Asʿad al-Yānyawī as a “professor”: 
in fact, the notes reportedly quote some excerpts of the works of “our professor, the 
philosopher Asʿad” (li-ustāḏinā al-faylasūf Asʿad), or even simply “the professor” 
(al-ustāḏ). Arguably, hand1 as well as the other handwritings of ms. A belong to 
some anonymous students of Asʿad al-Yānyawī, and should definitely be contextual-
ized in the framework of his school. 
Moreover, another handwriting (that I shall name hand2), copying, e.g., the begin-
ning of Kitāb al-Burhān on fol. 221v, could belong to a well-known disciple of Asʿad 
al-Yānyawī: in fact, it is a nastaʿlīq that highly resembles that of Muḥammad Ibn 
Aḥmad al-Uskūbī, copyist of ms. P. If the identification of hand2 with Muḥammad 
Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī holds, this piece of evidence is consistent with the estimated 
dating of hand1 (which was active around the year 1722 and is, therefore, contem-
porary with hand2, which copied ms. P in the same year), and both elements suggest 
that ms. A was copied in the same milieu and more or less at the same time as ms. P, 
i.e. in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople around the year 1722.
I.2.2. Ms. A as a Witness for al-Yānyawī’s Translations
As already stated, ms. A was heavily annotated by several students of Asʿad 
al-Yānyawī. Generally speaking, the notes quote many excerpts of translations 
ascribed to al-Yānyawī himself. More specifically, it is possible to identify in ms. A 
excerpts of al-Yānyawī’s translations of: 
A) The Aristotelian logical corpus:
 i. Porphyry’s Isagoge;
 ii. Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics;
B) Commentaries:
 iii. A commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge;
 iv. A commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics;
 v. A commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.
 
24 On the identification of this translation, see infra, §I.2.2.
25 On this point, see infra §I.2.2.
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(A) The Aristotelian Logical Corpus
Ms. A preserves several marginalia quoting Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s translations of por-
tions of the Aristotelian logical corpus.26 During the present inquiry, it was possible 
to identify with certainty several excerpts of a translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge (i) 
and at least a fragment of a translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (ii); in what 
follows, I shall provide a brief presentation of both cases.  
(i) Al-Yānyawī’s Translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge
In the margins of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Madḫal there are several marginalia quoting 
“Asʿad’s translation of Porphyry” (e.g. fol. 20v: tarğamat Asʿad li-Pūrfuriyūs): at a 
closer inspection, these marginalia appear to be excerpts of an Arabic translation of 
Porphyry’s Isagoge reportedly accomplished by Asʿad al-Yānyawī. As an example, 
I will transcribe below the marginal annotation preserved on fol. 24r, which is the 
quotation of an excerpt of Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s translation of a passage of Porphyry’s 
Isagoge concerning the shared features and the differences between the differentia 
specifica and the common accident (Porph. Isag. 19,17-20,10 Busse). 
T4. A fragment of Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge
Porph., Isag. 19,17-20,10 Busse Ms. A, margin of fol. 24r
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ 
συμβεβηκότος.
الرأس الثامن فيما يشترك فيه الفصل والعرض العاّم.
Διαφορᾷ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότι κοινὸν μὲν 
τὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι, κοινὸν δὲ πρὸς 
τὰ ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ 
προσεῖναι· τό τε γὰρ δίπουν ἀεὶ πρόσεστι πᾶσι 
κόραξι τό τε μέλαν ὁμοίως. 
مع  الفصل  ويشترك  الكثرة  على  المقولية  في  يشتركان   
الكل  في  موجودين  كونهما  في  الالزم  العاّم  العرض 
ودائما، فإّن ذا القدمين يوجد دائما في اإلنسان، وكذلك 
األسود يوجد في كل غراب دائما.
Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων διαφορᾶς καὶ συμβεβηκότος.
26 Here I mean by “Aristotelian logical corpus” the entire set of logical works studied in the scholastic cur-
riculum since Late Antiquity, including also a non-Aristotelian work like Porphyry’s Isagoge. 
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Διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ περιέχει, 
οὐ περιέχεται δέ· περιέχει γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τρόπον 
μέν τινα περιέχει τῷ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι, 
τρόπον δέ τινα περιέχεται τῷ μὴ ἑνὸς 
συμβεβηκότος εἶναι δεκτικὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα, 
ἀλλὰ πλειόνων. καὶ ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἀνεπίτατος 
καὶ ἀνάνετος, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα τὸ μᾶλλον 
καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεται. καὶ ἀμιγεῖς μὲν αἱ 
ἐναντίαι διαφοραί, μιγείη δ’ ἂν τὰ ἐναντία 
συμβεβηκότα.27
منه  أخّص  وليس  النوع  من  أعّم  الفصل  بأّن  ويفترقان 
أعّم  العاّم هو  والعرض  الملك واإلنسان؛  يعّم  الناطق  فإّن 
الكثير وأخّص من جهة أخرى، ألّن  من جهة لوجوده في 
أعراضا كثيرة؛  بل  فقط،  واحدا  يقبل عرضا  موضوعاته ال 
العاّم  والعرض  والضعف  الشّدة  يقبل  ال  الفصل  وبأّن 
يقبلهما؛ وبأّن الفصول المتقابلة ال يمكن أن تختلط وقد 
يمكن ذلك لألعراض العاّمة.
 ترجمة أسعد. 
27
The Arabic translation is clearly different from the one produced in the ʿAbbasid 
period by Abū ʿUṯmān al-Dimašqī (d. after 302 H/914), which is preserved in ms. 
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe 234628 and quoted in the lemmata 
of Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge.29 Al-Yānyawī’s translation 
is less literal and more inclined to provide an interpretative rendering, in order to 
attain a clearer understanding of the text. As an instance, the clause fa-inna al-nāṭiq 
yaʿummu al-malak wa-al-insān (“for ‘rational’ encompasses [both] the angel and the 
man”) is actually an interpretative rendering of the Greek περιέχει γὰρ τὸ λογικὸν 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον (“rational contains man”) ,30 where there is no explicit mention of the 
angel. It is, however, true that Porphyry considers ‘rational’ as a differentia specifica 
characterizing both the species of ‘man’ and that of the ‘divine entity’,31 and the use 
27 “Common to differences and accidents is the fact that they are said of several items. Common in relation 
to inseparable accidents is the fact that they are present always and to every case: biped is always present 
to all ravens, and so similarly is black. They differ because differences contain and are not contained 
(rational contains man), whereas accidents in a way contain in so far as they are in several items, and in 
a way are contained in that their subjects are receptive not of one accident but of several. Differences are 
unaugmentable and undiminishable, whereas accidents admit the more and the less. Contrary differences 
do not mix whereas contrary accidents will mix,” tr. Barnes, Porphyry, Introduction, p. 17-18.
28 Edited in Badawī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (1952), Manṭiq Arisṭū, 3 vol., Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub al-miṣriyya, 
Cairo, vol. III. The translation preserved in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe 2346 
seemingly coincides with the one preserved in ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana & 105 sup., edited by 
Baffioni Carmela (2011), “The Arabic Version of Porphyry’s Isagoge in the Ambrosiana Library,” Studi 
Filosofici 34, p. 37-72; see also Baffioni Carmela (2012), “Il manoscritto ambrosiano arabo & 105 sup. e 
la trasmissione delle opere di logica greca in arabo,” Studia graeco-arabica 2, p. 245-254. 
29 Ibn al-Ṭayyib Abū al-Farağ (1975), Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūğī li-Furfūriyūs, ed. Gyekye Kwame, Dar 
al-Mašriq, Beirut.
30 Tr. Barnes, Porphyry, Introduction, p. 17.
31 See Poprhyrius, Porphyrii Isagoge, p. 11.21-12.1: “They also present them thus: a difference is that by 
which each type of thing differs. For man and horse do not differ in virtue of their genus —both we and the 
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of the Greek περιέχει (“contains”) in this context points to the fact that the differentia 
specifica ‘rational’ has a greater extension of predication than the species ‘man’, 
since it is also predicated of the species ‘angel’. The translation by al-Dimašqī, on 
the other hand, rendered the same clause in a much more literal way: wa-ḏālika anna 
al-nāṭiq yaḥwī al-insān (“and this because ‘rational’ includes ‘man’”).32
This marginal note, as well as the others quoting excerpts of al-Yānyawī’s transla-
tion of Porphyry’s Isagoge, is obviously not an annotation directly composed in the 
margins of the manuscript. On the contrary, it seemingly reproduces a portion of 
a work already structured into chapters, as it is clear from the indication opening 
the marginal note, which points to the fact that the content of the note is part of an 
eighth chapter. 
The presence of this fragment in ms. A is extremely interesting: in fact, it should 
be identified as a quotation of an as of yet unstudied work by Asʿad al-Yānyawī, 
namely a recently discovered Latin into Arabic translation of the Aristotelian logical 
corpus preserved in ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238.33 
The entire series of marginal notes in ms. A, quoting al-Yānyawī’s translation of 
Porphyry’s Isagoge could be considered as an additional relevant witness for this 
newly discovered work.
(ii) Al-Yānyawī’s Translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
A marginal note in ms. A, fol. 241r, which ends with the clause “min tarğamat 
al-ustāḏ li-al-taʿlīm al-awwal” (“[taken] from the professor’s translation of the 
First Teaching [i.e. Aristotle]”), preserves an excerpt of al-Yānyawī’s translation of 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (T5).
non-rational items are mortal animals. But when rational is added it sets us apart from them. And both we 
and gods (θεοί) are rational. But when mortal is added it sets us apart from them,” tr. Barnes, Porphyry, 
Introduction, p. 11. More precisely, Porphyry speaks of ‘divine entities’ (θεοί), but the later commentators 
often spoke of ‘angels’; see Ammonius (1891), In Porphyrii Isagogen sive V voces, ed. Busse Adolf, (CAG 
IV.3) Reimer, Berlin, p. 70.13-20.
32 Badawī, Manṭiq Arisṭū, vol. III, p. 1064.
33 According to Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s own statements in the incipit, the work consists in a translation realized 
on the basis of an unspecified Latin source. On the discovery of this work in ms. H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238, see 
Morel Teymour and Genequand Charles, “Al-Yānyawī’s Account of Porphyry” in the present volume. I 
wish to thank the two authors of the paper for sharing with me some information concerning the manuscript 
and the work itself, and particularly I wish to thank Teymour Morel for helping me to compare the excerpts 
of the translation with the content of ms. H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238.
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T5. A fragment of al-Yānyawī’s translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
Arist., An. Post., I 4, 73a 34-b4. Ms. A, margin of fol. 241r
Καθ’ αὑτὰ δ’ ὅσα ὑπάρχει τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, 
οἷον τριγώνῳ γραμμὴ καὶ γραμμῇ στιγμή 
(ἡ γὰρ οὐσία αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτων ἐστί, καὶ ἐν 
τῷ λόγῳ τῷ λέγοντι τί ἐστιν ἐνυπάρχει), καὶ 
ὅσοις τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ 
λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχουσι τῷ τί ἐστι δηλοῦντι, οἷον 
τὸ εὐθὺ ὑπάρχει γραμμῇ καὶ τὸ περιφερές, καὶ 
τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμῷ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον 
καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἑτερόμηκες· 
καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ 
τῷ τί ἐστι λέγοντι ἔνθα μὲν γραμμὴ ἔνθα δ’ 
ἀριθμός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ 
τοιαῦθ’ ἑκάστοις καθ’αὑτὰ λέγω [...].34
أّن  الماهية، كما  في  توجد  التي  األشياء  بالذات  وأسمي 
فإّن  الخّط،  والنقطة في  المثّلث  بالذات في  الخّط يوجد 
الشارح  القول  في  ويوجدان  منهما،  تكون  ماهيتهما 
توجد  التي  األشياء  على  تحمل  التي  واألشياء  للماهية، 
أّن االستقامة  في القول الشارح لماهية تلك األشياء كما 
في  والزوج  والفرد  الخّط،  في  بالذات  توجدان  واالنحناء 
ويوجد  فيه؛  والمسّطح  والمرّبع  والمرّكب  واألّول  العدد، 
الخّط وفيها  موضوعها في تعريف كّل واحد منها فيهما 
العدد. وكذلك أسمي بالذات كّل شيء يكون كذلك. من 
ترجمة األستاذ للتعليم األوّل 
34
The passage is a translation of Aristotle’s definition of the senses of per se (καθ’ 
αὑτὸ) in Posterior Analytics I 4, reportedly accomplished by Asʿad al-Yānyawī, and 
copied in ms. A by one of his students, who designates him as a professor. This frag-
ment as well has to be identified as a part of the aforementioned Latin into Arabic 
translation by Asʿad al-Yānyawī preserved in ms. H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238.35
(B) Commentaries Translated by Al-Yānyawī
Ms. A also preserves some excerpts of Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s translations of a series 
of commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus. In particular, it is possible to identify 
quotations of his translations of commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics and Aristotle’s  Physics. In what follows, I will provide a sketchy 
presentation of some of these quotations found in the margins of ms. A.
34 “I describe one thing as ‛belonging per se’ to another (i) if it is an element in the essential nature of the 
other, as, e.g., a line belongs to a triangle and a point to a line (for the line or point is a constituent of the 
being of the triangle or line, and is an element in the formula which describes its essence); (ii) if it is an 
attribute the formula of whose essence includes the subject to which the attribute itself belongs. E.g., 
‛straight’ and ‛curved’ belong to ‛line’, ‛odd’ and ‛even,’ ‛prime’ and ‛compound,’ ‛square’ and ‛oblong’ 
belong to number; and the formula of the essence of each one of these includes line or number respectively. 
Similarly in all other cases I describe all terms of either of the kinds just described as belonging per se to 
their several subjects,” Tredennick Hugh (tr.) (1966), Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.)/London, p. 43-45.
35 I wish to thank Teymour Morel for the help he provided in the identification of this fragment too.
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(iii) A Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge
As to Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s translation of a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, a 
fragment of it is quoted in a marginal note on fol. 25v, which ends with the clause: 
min tarğamat al-ustāḏ sallamahu Allāh li-šarḥ Risālat Pūrfuriyūs (“[Taken] from 
the Professor’s, may God protect him, translation of a commentary on Porphyry’s 
treatise”). The passage is quoted in correspondence with the beginning of the Kitāb 
al-Maqūlāt; it states that the study of Porphyry’s Isagoge (mentioned both in the frag-
ment and at the end of it as Risālat Pūrfuriyūs) must precede the study of Aristotle’s 
logic because of the use of the knowledge of the universals before the knowledge of 
the categories.
The fragment is, actually, a quotation from al-Yānyawī’s al-Šarḥ al- anwar fī 
al-manṭiq,36 namely his translation of Ioannes Cottunius’ commentary on the first 
four books of Aristotle’s Organon and on Porphyry’s Isagoge (the already mentioned 
Compendiosa logica in usum scholarium) (see T6). Such an identification also pro-
vides us with a terminus post quem for the copy of this quotation in the margins of 
ms. A, namely the date in which al-Yānyawī completed his translation of Cottunius’ 
Compendiosa logica  (21 of Ğumādā al-āḫira 1134/ 8th of April 1722).37 
T6. Fol. 25v, incipit of the fragment  
Ioannes Cottunius, Compendiosa logica in 
usum scholarium, p. 68
Ms. A, fol. 25v
Primo rectissime ait [scil. Porphyry], 
speculationem Praedicabilium esse 
necessariam ad notitiam Praedicamentorum. 
Nam Praedicamentum nihil aliud est, quam 
coordinatio Praedicabilium, in qua superiora 
genera per differentias distribuuntur in suas 
species, ut infra patebit [...].38
فإّن  المقوالت،  لفهم  ضروري  الكّليات  معرفة  أّن  اعلم 
المقوالت ليست إاّل ترتيب الكّليات يبّين فيه أّن األجناس 
فيما  سيظهر  كما  بالفصول،  أقسامه  إلى  تنقسم  العالية 
بعد ]...[.
38
36 This title is already mentioned among Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s works in Tahir Mehmed B. (1914-1923), 
Ösmanlı Müellifleri, 3 vol., Matbaa-i Amire, Istanbul, vol. I, p. 235. For the manuscripts that preserve the 
work, see Özervarlı, “Yanyalı Esad Efendi’s works,” p. 464 n. 24.
37 Cf. supra §I.1.1.
38 “Know that the knowledge of the predicables is necessary in order to understand the categories, since a 
category is nothing but an arrangement of predicables in which the summa genera are divided into their 
species by the differentiae specificae, as it will be clarified in what follows [...].” Noteworthy, the Arabic 
translation renders the Latin “praedicabilia” by kulliyyāt (“universals”), very likely to avoid a confusion 
with “praedicamenta,” rendered as maqūlāt.
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Besides the fragment whose incipit is reproduced in T6, ms. A preserves several 
other excerpts of the translation of the commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge: there 
are, for instance, three fragments commenting upon Porphyry’s classification of dif-
ferentia specifica on fol. 16v that are taken from a not better specified “commentary 
on Porphyry” (šarḥ Pūrfuriyūs), whose translation is not explicitly ascribed to Asʿad 
al-Yānyawī, but that are part of the same work. 
(iv) A Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
A folio added between fol. 243v and fol. 244r quotes two long excerpts of Asʿad 
al-Yānyawī’ translation of a commentary on Aristotle, which is arguably a com-
mentary on Posterior Analytics. In fact, the first of the two quotations comments 
upon the notion of the predication “of all” (κατὰ παντός),39 whereas the other com-
ments upon the universal (καθόλου) predication as a predication “of all” and “per 
se”.40 One of the two excerpts ends with the clause min tarğamat al-ustāḏ li-šarḥ 
al-Taʿlīm al-Awwal (“[taken] from the Professor’s translation of a commentary on 
the First Teaching [i.e. Aristotle]”), whereas the other simply ends with the clause 
min tarğamat al-ustāḏ sallamahu Allāh. These fragments are presented, respec-
tively, as the second and the fourth sections of a chapter (al-qism al-ṯānī and al-qism 
al-rābiʿ li-hāḏā al-faṣl) of the work they quote. At a closer inspection, they actually 
correspond to the secunda pars and quarta capitis pars at p. 267 and p. 274 of 
Ioannes Cottunius’ Compendiosa logica in usum scholarium. Both excerpts in ms. 
A report the date of 29 Ṣafar 1135 (= December 8th, 1722), written in red ink at the 
end of the quotation. Since it doesn’t correspond with the date of composition of 
al-Yānyawī’s translation of the Compendiosa logica, the date must refer to the time 
at which this quotation was inserted in ms. A, namely eight months after the end of 
al-Yānyawī’s translation.
(v) A Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 
The recto of the folio inserted between fol. 236v and 237r quotes al-Yānyawī’s 
translation of a commentary on Aristotle, introduced by the clause: qāla al-ustāḏ 
al-faylasūf sallamahu Allāh taʿālā fī tarğamatihi li-šarḥ al-Taʿlīm al-Awwal. Although 
it is not specified, this excerpt is seemingly another portion of the aforementioned 
translation of a commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (iv), dealing with the 
39 See Aristotle, Prior and Posterior Analytics, I 4, 73a28-34 (ed. Ross David W., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1957).
40 Ibid., I 4, 73b25-74a2.
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principles of the demonstrative syllogism. The verso of the same folio, on the other 
hand, quotes al-Yānyawī’s translation of a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, intro-
duced by the clause: qāla al-ustāḏ al-faylasūf sallamahu Allāh taʿālā fī tarğamatihi 
li-šarḥ ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Taʿlīm al-Awwal. This marginal quotation is actually an excerpt 
of al-Yānyawī’s al-Taʿlīm al-ṯāliṯ,41 namely his translation of Ioannes Cottunius’ 
commentary on Aristotle’s Physics.42 Although al-Yānyawī’s al-Taʿlīm al-ṯāliṯ is still 
unedited, the identification of this fragment of the Arabic translation is possible by 
comparing it with the Latin text of Cottunius’ commentary (see T7).
T7. Identification of the translation of Ioannes Cottunius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 
Ioannes Cottunius, Commentarii lucidissimi 
in octo libros Aristotelis De physico auditu 
(p. 93, § VI)
Ms. A, verso of the folio inserted between 
fol. 236v and 237r
---
قال األستاذ الفيلسوف سّلمه الله تعالى في ترجمته لشرح 
طبيعيات التعليم األّول: 
Perpend. 3 circa tex. 9 quod θέσις, positio, 
inter alia significat etiam inopinabilem 
quandam opinionem, et quae suam ipsa 
secum praeseferat improbabilitatem, prolatam 
tamen ab aliquo praeclaro, ac celebrato 
Philosopho. Qua de re audi Philosophum in 
primo Topic. cap. 1 θέσις, positio, inquit, est 
existimatio extranea alicuius eorum, quorum 
in Philosophia illustris est et pervagata 
fama, veluti non posse contradici, ut placet 
Antistheni, vel moveri omnia, ut est sententia 
Heracliti, vel unum
ويستفاد من هذا المبّين التاسع أّن لفظ َثِسْس أْي الوضع 
يدّل على رأي ظاهر الفساد وصادر عن حكم مشهور معتبر 
عن غفلة. ولتعرّف هذا الشيء اسمع ما قال المصنّف في 
الفصل األّول في أّول الجدل إّن ثسْس أْي الوضع هو ظّن 
في  المشهورين  المعروفين  من  الحكماء  ألحد  خارجي 
الفلسفة، مثل ما قال آمِسْتَسيوسْ ]sic[ ال يمكن أن يقال 
قول مناقض لقول، أو كما قال هراقلتوس إّن جميع األشياء 
تتبّدل،
esse omnia, quemadmodum ait Melissus. 
[...].43
أو كما قال ملوس إّن جميع األشياء واحد ]...[.
41 For a description of the work and a list of the manuscripts preserving it, see Özervarlı, “Yanyalı Esad 
Efendi’s works,” p. 464.
42 Cottunius Ioannes (1648), Commentarii lucidissimi in octo libros Aristotelis De physico auditu, Impensis 
Pauli Frambotti, Venice.
43 “Thirdly it can be considered, with regard to text 9, that θέσις, i.e. ‘thesis’, among other [notions], also 
means a certain inconceivable opinion, which shows it itself its own improbability, but which is asserted 
by a well-known and admired philosopher. About this subject, I’ve learned from the Philosopher [i.e. 
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The excerpt quoted in ms. A is a fragment of al-Yānyawī’s translation of a pas-
sage of Ioannes Cottunius’ commentary, which comments on the use of the word 
θέσις in Aristotle, Phys. I 2, 185a 5-7,44 by recalling the Aristotelian explanation 
of the term in Top. I 1, 104b 19-22. Interestingly, the Arabic translation offers both 
a transliteration of the Greek term mentioned by Cottunius (ṯasis) and an Arabic 
translation of it (waḍʿ), corresponding to the Latin rendering provided by Cottunius 
(positio). The Arabic translation quoted in the excerpt seems to be a quite faithful 
rendering of the original Latin text. 
The discovery of these excerpts of Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s translations in ms. A is of 
the utmost interest for the study of his activity as a translator. The commentaries 
quoted in these marginalia (B) are excerpts of two already known —though still 
unedited— translations by Asʿad al-Yānyawī. More specifically, the excerpts (iii-iv) 
are quotations of al-Yānyawī’s al-Šarḥ al- anwar fī al-manṭiq, and the excerpt (v) is 
a quotation of al-Yānyawī’s al-Taʿlīm al-ṯāliṯ. A study of these excerpts preserved in 
ms. A could offer an interesting perspective on the circulation and reception of his 
works within his school. 
The study of the marginalia in ms. A can also provide a brand-new contribution 
to the knowledge of his production. In support of this claim, I shall mention the 
discovery of the excerpts quoting al-Yānyawī’s translations of Porphyry’s Isagoge (i) 
and of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (ii). In fact, this is worth of the utmost interest, 
since all these excerpts turned out to be quotations from a unique work, the newly 
discovered and still unedited translation of Aristotle’s logical corpus preserved in 
ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238. In the prospect of 
providing a critical edition of the work preserved in ms. H. Hüsnu Paşa 1238, ms. 
A could be an additional witness to take into account, given the great number of 
quotations preserved in there and given that the quotations were copied by some 
direct disciples of the author, very likely under his supervision, which makes ms. A 
a valuable witness for the text. 
Aristotle] in the first [book] of the Topics, chap. 1 [104b19-22]: “θέσις, i.e. ‘thesis’,” he says, “is a strange 
opinion held by someone of those who are famous and who are widely known in the domain of philoso-
phy, like ‘contradiction is impossible,’ as Antisthenes claims, or ‘everything changes,’ as it is claimed by 
Heraclitus, or ‘all the things are one,’ as Melissus says”[...].”
44 “So to enquire whether being is this sort of unity is no different from addressing any other thesis (gr. θέσις) 
of the kind which is advanced just for the sake of argument —the Heraclitean thesis, for instance, or the 
idea that being is a single person, or such a thesis as that Being is one man,” tr. Waterfield Robin (tr.) 
(1996), Aristotle, Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford/ New York, p. 10.
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II. Mss. P and A Within the Manuscript Tradition of 
Avicenna’s Šifāʾ
II.1. Mss. P and A as Witnesses of the “Razian Branch”  
of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ
As it has been shown so far, mss. P and A are precious sources for the study of 
Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s exegetical activity. In what follows, I will argue that they are 
also relevant witnesses of an earlier exegetical activity concerning Avicenna’s Šifāʾ. 
Both manuscripts preserve a set of anonymous marginalia that are also preserved 
in three thirteenth-century manuscripts of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ which are stemmatically 
related to mss. P and A,45 and in a later undated manuscript (ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye 
Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 910) which is not stemmatically related to the others, but 
on the margins of which a second handwriting imported the marginalia by collation. 
Interestingly, this latter manuscript preserves, at the end of each of the marginal 
notes, a certificate of transmission ascribing them to the theologian and philosopher 
Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).46 
Generally speaking, these marginalia denote a scholastic exegetical activity. In 
fact, the marginal notes to the Šifāʾ ascribed to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī are evidently 
meant to be a tool to facilitate the understanding of the main text, though without 
being a commentary in the same sense in which, for instance, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s 
Šarḥ al-Išārāt is. A clear evidence of the difference between the two kinds of exege-
ses is the fact that the author of the marginal notes abstains from any sort of verifica-
tion (taḥqīq) and criticism of Avicenna’s statements,47 confining himself to a plain 
and didactic clarification of the text, contrary to what happens in the commentary on 
Avicenna’s Išārāt. 
As a case study, I shall mention two marginalia, which are a plain paraphrase 
of K. al-Madḫal I 5 (p. 30,18-32,3), concerning the relationship of the notion of 
“essential” (ḏātī) to the notion of “signifying the quiddity” (dāll ʿalā al-māhiyya). 
45 Namely ms. Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi, 2710 (dat. 25 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 666 – 25 Šawwāl 666/
December 21st 1267 – July 15th 1268); ms. Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt 331 falsafa (ḫuṣūṣiyya), 
44988 (ʿumūmiyya) (dat. 7th /13th century); ms. Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (dat. 
693/1293-4). On these manuscripts and their relation to mss. P and A, see Di Vincenzo, “Early Exegetical 
Practice on Avicenna’s Šifāʾ.”
46 The certificate of transmission is introduced by the clause min ḫaṭṭ (“from the copy/from the writing of...”), 
or nuqila min ḫaṭṭ (“it was copied from the copy/writing of...”); see Di Vincenzo, “Early Exegetical 
Practice on Avicenna’s Šifāʾ.”
47 On the features of the practice of taḥqīq, see Wisnovky Robert (2013), “Avicennism and Exegetical 
Practice in the Early Commentaries on the Ishārāt,” Oriens 41, p. 349-378, esp. p. 354-357.  
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Avicenna’s claim, in this regard, is that the notion of “essential” is more general 
than the notion of “signifying the quiddity,” for the first one can be comprehensive 
of the latter. Avicenna aims at demonstrating, against the doubts raised by some 
philosophers, that what signifies the quiddity can be enumerated among the essen-
tials, although “essential” is not simply equivalent to “signifying the quiddity,” but is 
rather a notion with a broader extension. 
In order to do so, he proceeds with a diairetical argument: (1) first of all 
(K. al-Madḫal I 5, p. 30,18-31,16), he rules out the possibility that what signifies the 
quiddity of a species (for instance, “man”) can be essential in relation to the species’ 
quiddity itself, since it would be equivalent to state that “man” is essential to “man,” 
which is absurd. A second possibility (2) is that what signifies the quiddity signi-
fies an individual’s quiddity: employing the example of man (insān) in relation to 
individual (šaḫṣ), Avicenna tries to prove (K. al-Madḫal I 5, p. 31, 6-14) that “man” 
is essential to individuals. In such a case, then, “man” should either be essential (2.1) 
because it is essential to the individuals’ quiddity (which is, again, “man,” but this 
case must be rejected for the same reasons the hypothesis that “man” could be essen-
tial for itself was rejected) or (2.2) because it is a part of the complex of features that 
make them individuals, which could entail that the accidental features characterizing 
the individual would be essential as well, but this would be an awkward and unde-
sired conclusion. To avoid such a conclusion, Avicenna provides in the subsequent 
passage (K. al-Madḫal I 5, p. 31,17-32,3) a definition of “essential” that prevents the 
inclusion of the accidental features of the individual among its essential character-
istics. The two marginalia on the Šifāʾ are just a summary and a paraphrase of this 
argument in K. al-Madḫal I 5, p. 31,6-14, without any further comment. 
Interestingly enough, the study of this passage of the Šifāʾ served Faḫr al-Dīn 
al-Rāzī when he commented upon a parallel passage of the Išārāt (p. 204-5 ed. 
Dunyā).48 In that passage, Avicenna deals with the same matter, stating that the spe-
cies signifies the quiddity of its individuals and is, at the same time, essential for 
them, though without discussing it in detail. It is quite evident that al-Rāzī must have 
had in mind the passage from K. al-Madḫal I 5 when commenting on the passage 
of the Išārāt, for he recalls exactly the aforementioned argument. Moreover, when 
al-Rāzī reports (Šarḥ al-Išārāt, p. 62, 3-13) Avicenna’s definition of the “essential” 
as the universal notion whose remotion from its subject causes the remotion of the 
subject itself, he is evidently referring to the immediately-following passage in 
K. al-Madḫal I 5 (p. 31,17-32,3). 
48 Ibn Sīnā (1960), al-Išārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt maʿa Šarḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, ed. Dunyā Sulaymān, Dār 
al-Maʿārif, Cairo.
Silvia Di Vincenzo346
Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 67 (2017-2018)
Noteworthy, Avicenna’s argument, which is reported in a neutral way in the 
marginalia on the Šifāʾ, is sharply criticized in the Šarḥ al-Išārāt,49 where al-Rāzī 
claims that one thing, in relation to something else, cannot be, at one and the same 
time, essential and signifying the quiddity. For instance, (1) humanity represents, 
in relation to humanity, the totality of its quiddity, though without being essential 
to it, because of the impossibility for anything to be in relation to itself. Then, (2) 
humanity can also be in relation to its particulars, but in this case, it doesn’t represent 
their quiddity in its totality. In fact, the quiddity of an individual is made by both 
shared and distinctive properties, whereas humanity is only the shared feature, being, 
therefore, just a part of the individual’s quiddity. Hence, humanity does not actually 
signify the quiddity of the things it is essential for, which allows al-Rāzī to draw the 
conclusion that, if humanity, for instance, represents the complete quiddity of some-
thing (tamām māhiyyatihi), it isn’t, however, essential for that something; if, on the 
contrary, humanity is not the entire quiddity of something, but rather a part of it, then 
it is essential for it, but it doesn’t signify its quiddity.50 Hence the impossibility for 
something of being, at the same time, both signifying the quiddity and essential for 
the same thing, which contrasts Avicenna’s claim of K. al-Madḫal I 5 that “essential” 
is a more general notion that can encompass the more specific notion of “signi-
fying the quiddity.”51 Al-Rāzī’s objection to Avicenna basically exploits the same 
49 Al-Rāzī Faḫr al-Dīn (1964), Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-al-tanbīhāt, ed. Najafzadeh Ali Reza, Anjuman-i Āthār 
va Mafākhir-i Farhangī, Tehran, p. 63.3-12: “My own verification [of the subject] (al-taḥqīq) is that it is 
not so, because “man” is essential for “man” either [(i)] in relation to the extent that is shared (al-qadr 
al-muštarak) among the individuals, [i.e.] humanity, so that the idea becomes that “man” is essential for 
“man”. Or [(ii)] it is essential in relation to the particulars that are under it, but the quiddity of that particular 
doesn’t arise from the humanity that is something abstract by which there is sharing, but it arises from it and 
from that by means of which there is differentiation (al-imtiyāz) from what is shared in humanity. If it is so, 
then, humanity is not the complete quiddity (tamām al-māhiyya) of that particular, but rather a part (ğuzʾ) 
of that quiddity. The result is that it is impossible for humanity to be essential for [the things] for which 
humanity represents the complete quiddity, in virtue of the impossibility for anything to be related to itself. 
[On the contrary,] humanity is not signifying the quiddity, in relation to that for which humanity is not the 
complete quiddity. Therefore, it is impossible for the same one thing in relation to the same one thing to be 
essential and, at the same time, to signify [its] quiddity.”
50 The same argument is provided in al-Rāzī Faḫr al-Dīn (2002-2003), Manṭiq al-Mulaḫḫaṣ, ed. Qarāmalikī 
Farāmarz A. and Aṣġarīnizhād Ādīna, Intišārāt-i Dānišgāh-i Imām Ṣādiq, Tehran, p. 38.6-10: “It is impos-
sible to call what signifies the quiddity “essential,” because the essential is [(i)] either essential for itself, but 
this is absurd, since the essential is related to the essence and it is impossible for anything to be in relation 
to itself; or [(ii)] [it is essential] for something else, but this is vain, because that with respect of which it is 
essential is, inescapably, composed by it and by something else, hence it [i.e. the essential feature] is [just] 
one of its parts, so that it doesn’t signify its quiddity, because one of the parts of the composite doesn’t 
signify the complete quiddity (tamām al-māhiyya).”
51 In Manṭiq al-Mulaḫḫaṣ, p. 44, 2-15, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī describes five definitions of “essential” provided 
by philosophers. Avicenna’s definition of “essential” presented in K. al-Madḫal I 5 seems to match with 
the position held by the third group of philosophers, defining the “essential” as “what cannot be removed 
from the quiddity”. In the same passage, al-Rāzī explicitly endorses the position of the fifth group of 
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diairetical scheme employed in Avicenna’s argument, though with a completely dif-
ferent assumption concerning the quiddity of the individual. In fact, Avicenna made 
it coincide with the specific quiddity, to which other features that are proper to each 
individual occur.52 In al-Rāzī’s own view, on the other hand, the individual’s quiddity 
as a whole is composed by a shared factor (al-qadr al-muštarak), which is common 
to all the individuals of the same species (i.e. the specific quiddity), and a distin-
guishing factor (al-qadr al-mumayyiz) that allows the distinction of an individual 
from the others (i.e. the proper distinguishing features of each individual).53 As a 
consequence, the essential constituents of the individual form are, actually, a part 
of its quiddity (the shared one), rather than the whole of it. This kind of analysis is 
quite peculiar of al-Rāzī’s thought, and was later rejected by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī  in 
his own commentary on Avicenna’s Išārāt, where he basically reassessed Avicenna’s 
view on the subject.54
To sum up, supposing that al-Rāzī is the author of the marginalia to the Šifāʾ, the 
comparison between the marginalia on K. al-Madḫal and the commentary on the 
Išārāt showed that, even if he didn’t agree with Avicenna’s claim in K. al-Madḫal I 5, 
in his marginalia he confined himself to a plain paraphrase of the passage.
Given the apparently “impersonal” style of these marginalia, it is difficult to tell 
with certainty on a philosophical basis whether the authorial ascription preserved in 
the manuscript tradition is reliable or not.
As to their possible dating, these marginalia are copied in the thirteenth-century 
manuscripts in the same handwriting that is responsible for the copy of the main 
text, which means that they were copied, together with the main text, from an 
earlier antigraph. Hence, it can be concluded that this corpus of marginalia is, at 
least, surely earlier than the second half of the thirteenth century (given that the 
earliest of the three manuscripts dates to 666/1267-8). An ascription to Faḫr al-Dīn 
al-Rāzī, therefore, cannot be easily ruled out, neither on a philosophical basis nor on 
a chronological one. However it might be, the discovery of this set of marginalia is 
worthy of attention, because it provides a clue to the existence of an early exegetical 
philosophers, claiming that the “essential” is “what is a part of the quiddity (ğuzʾ al-māhiyya),” which 
excludes what signifies the entire quiddity of something from the essential features.
52 Avicenna (K. al-Madḫal I 5, p. 29.2-13 Cairo ed.) clearly identifies the quiddity of an individual with that 
of the species (the example is that of the individual man, whose quiddity is determined by his humanity). 
53 On these two “factors” and their role in the definition, see also Ibrahim Bilal (2013), “Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, 
Ibn al-Hayṯam and Aristotelian Science: Essentialism versus Phenomenalism in Post-Classical Islamic 
Thought,” Oriens 41, p. 379-431.
54 In fact, al-Ṭūsī’s commentary on the same passage of Avicenna’s Išārāt (see Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt wa-al-
Tanbīhāt, ed. Dunyā, p. 205 n. 9) is a defence of Avicenna’s claim that the specific nature, such as “human-
ity,” does signify the quiddity of an individual, since it is the entire quiddity of that individual (wa-tilka 
al-ṭabīʿatu innamā hiya tamāmu māhiyyati tilka al-ašḫāṣi).
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practice concerning Avicenna’s Šifāʾ, in spite of an apparently poor production of 
commentaries on the text between the eleventh and the sixteenth century.55 Mss. P 
and A, which both preserve these marginalia, well represent the transmission of a 
thirteenth-century cultural heritage up to the eighteenth century.
II.2. The exemplar of mss. P and A 
Besides having been produced within the same scholastic milieu, mss. P and A also 
derive from the same exemplar (that I shall name, for the sake of simplicity, ms. δ).56 
In what follows, I shall try to argue for this claim on two different bases: (i) on the 
basis of Lachmann’s criterion of the presence of shared mistakes in the text of both 
witnesses; (ii) on the basis of the presence in both witnesses of the aforementioned 
set of marginalia ascribed to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, copied together with the main text 
and affected, on their turn, by shared mistakes. 
(i) As to the first criterion, that is to determine a stemmatic relation between the 
two manuscripts, both manuscripts share the same accidental omission affecting the 
text of K. al-ʿIbāra II 2, p. 93, 9-1157 (the underlined clause in T8). 
T8. Ibn Sīnā, al-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-ʿIbāra, II.2, p. 93.9-11 and the omission 
shared by mss. P and A
من  معدوم  هو  ما  على  تصدق  السوالب  ألّن  الموجبات،  تلزم  السوالب  ذلك كانت  يعتبر  لم  فإن 
الموضوعات وال يمتنع.
So that, if this is not taken into account, the negative statements necessarily follow 
the affirmative ones, since the negative statements give assent to the subjects that 
do not exist without being impossible.
(ii) As to the second criterion, in the margins of the same folio both mss. P and 
A preserve one of the marginalia ascribed to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, commenting on a 
slightly preceding passage (K. al-ʿIbāra II 2, p. 93, 2). What is more, in both manu-
scripts the clause accidentally omitted in K. al-ʿIbāra II 2, p. 93, 9-11 is integrated in 
the margin, but it is wrongly included as a part of the marginal note commenting on 
K. al-ʿIbāra II 2, p. 93, 2 (see T9).
55 On this point, see Wisnovsky Robert (2013), “Avicenna’s Islamic reception,” in Adamson Peter (ed.), 
Interpreting Avicenna, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 190-213, esp. p. 194.
56 The two manuscripts are seemingly not derived from each other, for each of them has mistakes that are not 
shared with the other.
57 Quoted from the edition: Ibn Sīnā (1970), al-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, 3. al-ʿIbāra, ed. Madkūr Ibrāhīm and 
al-Ḫuḍayrī Maḥmūd, al-Hayʿa al-miṣriyya al-ʿāmma li-al-kitāb, Cairo.
The Circulation of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā’ in the School of Asʿad al-Yānyawī 349
T9. A shared mistake in a marginal note in mss. P and A
The marginal note as it is preserved in the 
other manuscripts
The marginal note in mss. P and A
أي بعد أن يكون الموضوع الذي هو اإلنسان موجودا غير 
معدوم.
موجودا  اإلنسان  هو  الذي  الموضوع  يكون  أن  بعد  أي 
غير معدوم ألّن السوالب تصدق على ما هو معدوم من 
الموضوعات*.
“I.e. provided the fact that the subject that is 
the man is existent [and] not non-existent.”58
__________
*  The underlined part exactly corresponds to the clause omitted in mss. P and A in K. al-
ʿIbāra II 2, p. 93, 9-11.
58
As to the genesis of this phenomenon, it can be supposed that the addition of the 
omitted portion of text in the margin of an ancestor of mss. P and A was mistaken 
for a part of the marginal note written slightly above it, and therefore included in 
the marginal note in the copies derived from it. It is possible to figure out that this 
peculiar mistake was already there in the common antigraph of the two manuscripts 
(ms. δ): in fact, the presence of the same graphic confusion in both mss. P and A 
suggests that the two manuscripts are accurate reproductions of ms. δ. 
To sum up, on the basis of both the aforementioned criteria (i) and (ii), it can be 
argued that mss. P and A are copies of the same exemplar. The results provided by 
the analysis of the stemmatic relations between the two manuscripts are consistent 
with the data of the historical reconstruction conducted so far: the two manuscripts 
were copied in the same context (i.e. within the school of Asʿad al-Yānyawī) and 
from the same copy (i.e. ms. δ). Arguably, ms. δ was a manuscript that preserved 
at least the section on logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ and descended, in its turn, from 
a copy related to the three aforementioned thirteenth-century manuscripts. These 
manuscripts altogether form a branch of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ 
that could be named “Razian branch,” since it is characterized by the presence of a 
set of exegetical marginal notes ascribed to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, that were evidently 
transmitted at least up to the eighteenth century. 
58 The purpose of this marginal note is to clarify, with regard to K. al-ʿIbāra II 2, p. 93, 2: “... provided the 
aforementioned condition (baʿd al-šarṭ al-maḏkūr),” what is the “aforementioned condition” to which 
Avicenna refers.
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Conclusions
As the present inquiry tried to show, a careful study of mss. P and A is able to provide 
new insights into the intellectual activity within the circle of Asʿad al-Yānyawī, and 
even some new textual evidence of Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s own production concerning 
the Aristotelian logic. In addition to that, both manuscripts revealed themselves as 
precious witnesses of a stratified exegetical activity on Avicenna’s Šifāʾ, collecting 
several philosophical marginalia produced between the thirteenth and the eighteenth 
century. In sum, it can be stated that mss. P and A are outstanding witnesses attest-
ing a continuity of the exegetical tradition concerning Avicenna’s Šifāʾ between the 
period which was defined as the “golden age of Arabic philosophy” (1000-1350 ca.)59 
and that moment of cultural vibrancy for the Ottoman history that is represented by 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. One should expect a more systematic study 
of this sort of marginalia to be able to cast a new light on the exegetical activity 
concerning Avicenna’s Šifāʾ throughout the centuries.
59 Gutas, “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000 – ca. 1350,” p. 81-97.
